John R. Alison: Oh, hi, how are you?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: I\u2019m fine, sir. How are you doing today?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Hold on just one second.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: No problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: I\u2019m sorry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Oh, that\u2019s fine, sir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Is it Cadet Jackson?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Yes, sir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Hello?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Sir, I appreciate you agreeing to talk to me about this paper that I\u2019m writing. I very much appreciate that and it\u2019s a pleasure to talk to you.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Well, it\u2019s nice to be able to talk to you. Can you hear me all right?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: I can hear you just fine, sir. I have to have you on a speakerphone so that I can record what we’re talking about so I don’t have to write so fast. But I have some questions prepared if you\u2019d be willing, sir, about your time in China.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: I can do that. But first, can you hear me all right?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: I can hear you just fine, sir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Okay. Okay.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: I sent you a draft of my paper. My paper\u2019s thesis basically is that the American Air Force in China was successful due to leadership. That was the defining feature that made our air force superior to the Japanese Air Force was leadership. Especially on the lower levels where people in the squadron and even below that level were able to take initiative and that was why they were able to defeat the Japanese. I was wondering, sir, from your point of view, what do you believe was the primary factor that made the Americans successful in the Air War in China?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: It was Chennault and his knowledge\u2014or his perception or conception\u2014of air warfare and his knowledge.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Would you say, sir, that his ability to also choose leaders\u2014squadron commanders like Tex Hill\u2014would you say that was also a factor in how the Americans were able to do well against the Japanese?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Yes, I would. Tex was a great leader and a great American. And he\u2019s still around.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Yes, sir. And you and he are two of my biggest heroes. I\u2019ve done a lot of reading about the war in China and that\u2019s mostly why I decided to do this paper. Because it was something I was very interested in and that\u2019s why I\u2019m really excited to be able to talk to you right now, sir, you’re one of my biggest heroes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Don\u2019t overdo it! I\u2019m just an ordinary guy and I\u2019m fortunate to have lived through it\u2014and also fortunate to have had that experience.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: I totally look up to you. You’re definitely somebody that I respect very greatly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Well, you flatter me, and I appreciate it, that’s very nice to have someone say that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Oh, well, you\u2019ve definitely earned it, sir. I was wondering, sir, how would you describe the supply situation in China? Especially as it related to how you were able to launch sorties or conduct training?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Well, it was hand-to-mouth. Our source of supply was, as you well know, was over the Hump and it was very meager. We made do often by cannibalizing and then saving every bit of wreckage that we could. For example, you may have read that in my first fight I had to put the airplane in the river.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Yes, sir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: The Chinese pulled it up and I understand that later major portions of it flew again.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: So, you would describe it as a pretty desperate supply situation compared to any other theater in the war, sir?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: It was. Supplies were definitely a big part of the war, and we had very limited supply. I was not much into the supply business. But I was always amazed at the fact that when the time came, our mechanics would have an airplane ready for me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: That\u2019s excellent. And from what I\u2019ve read, those guys definitely worked very hard, above and beyond to get those planes ready.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: That\u2019s right. And of course, you undoubtedly have read the story of Gerhard Neumann.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Yes, sir. He\u2019s the one that put the Japanese fighter back together.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: That\u2019s right. But he was an unusual man, a German citizen, but a very loyal American, too. And he was really a mechanical genius. We knew he was a great mechanic, but we really didn\u2019t fully understand how talented he was. And we had lots of men who were not only talented, but they worked so hard at keeping us flying. They played a big role in our success in China. But our biggest success was Chennault\u2019s very simple understanding of air warfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
He recognized that all of the airplanes had limitations, and all the airplanes had certain strengths and he devised tactics around the strength of our airplanes with the weakness of theirs. And if we listened to him, we were usually successful. The problem was that sometimes we didn\u2019t listen.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I tried dogfighting with the Japanese. I thought I was very good at it and perhaps I was when I was fighting against other P-40s. But when it came to fighting against the Japanese Zero, if you fought according to his rules, you were sure to lose. If you fought according to Chennault\u2019s rules, you had a good chance not only of surviving but of being victorious.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Sir, how would you compare the P-40 to the Japanese fighters, the durability, the speed, how do they compare generally?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Well, basically, our airplanes were a little bit faster and, in a dive, we became even faster. Our airplanes were clean, they were heavy, and they were very durable. And if you put a P-40 into a dive, if you didn\u2019t get shot down in the brief interval when they were close, you could always get away. But there were a few minutes of the combat when you were exposed, and our airplanes were structurally stronger\u2014and I\u2019m living proof that they were.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I\u2019ve had airplanes that were shot up badly and yet I got home. And I got home with severely damaged airplanes. But I was lucky, I wasn\u2019t hit in a vital spot. I\u2019ve also seen P-40s explode in a ball of flame just the same way the Japanese airplanes exploded. But as you know, undoubtedly have read, Chennault\u2019s theory was, one, we had superior speed, although it was sometimes marginal. We had superior firepower and there was no question about that, our six .50-caliber guns were far superior to the armament that the Japanese had. And then our airplanes were far more durable. Unless you got hit in a vital spot, a P-40 would go through a lot of fire and still keep flying. And so Chennault took advantage of those strong points of our airplanes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The Japanese airplanes were highly maneuverable. They were good flying airplanes\u2014they were easier to fly\u2014and if they got into a good position, they could kill you. But Chennault had a little ditty: \u201cIt\u2019s better to fight and run away and live to fight another day.\u201d And we had that advantage. If we found ourselves in a position of disadvantage, we could take advantage of the speed and the durability of the P-40 to actually get out of range of his guns and come back at him when you had a position of advantage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And if you couldn\u2019t get in a position of advantage, you could just leave the fight. And there was no stigma if you didn\u2019t stay and fight. And I think everybody wanted to stay and fight. And I stayed several occasions too long, and I was lucky the durability of the P-40 carried me through it. And basically, that was Chennault\u2019s formula.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
In addition to that, he had intelligence sources who often knew when we were going to be attacked and from what direction the attack was coming. So that, on many occasions\u2014well, because of the warning net, although it was crude, the warning net let us know very often where the Japanese were before they knew where we were. And that is a tremendous advantage because you can put your airplanes in a position where they are at higher risk than you are.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And Chennault knew all of us, he understood the performance characteristics of the Japanese airplanes and he understood the performance characteristics of ours because he was an expert pilot himself, and taking advantage of this knowledge was advantageous to us.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: That\u2019s fascinating. And I\u2019m wondering, I know that you were with the 1st Air Commando group later on. I was wondering if you\u2019d compare the P-40 with the early model P-51s, especially in how they\u2019d fare against the Japanese fighters, because I know that the 23rd fighter group got P-51s around 1943.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: \u201843, that\u2019s right. I was in India with the 1st Air Commandos ready to fly a glider in behind the Japanese lines, when Tex Hill showed up at our forward base in a P-51\u2014a beautiful airplane. By that time, we were able to get some P-51s for the 1st Air Commandos, but they were the P-51A, with the Allison engine just like the P-40. But aerodynamically, they were a better airplanes than the P-40. And they were a little bit faster and had much longer range. And that was because basically, the P-51 was designed, I guess for a more powerful Merlin engine. And of course, when the P-51s got the Merlin engine, they became far superior to the P-40. But the P-51As which we used in the 1st Air Commando had performance characteristics very much like the P-40, except for their improved range and, in some respects, they were just a more versatile airplane than the P-40.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Right. How did the durability compare, sir, as far as the P-51 compared to the P-40?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
How did the what?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The durability?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison:<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I don\u2019t know. I never had a P-51 hit as hard as my P-40s were hit. I was in one fight in the P-40, and I was doing very well. The first airplane I hit and that we were hit by\u2014I was escorting B-24s and I had seven Chinese pilots and one American with me. So, there\u2019s nine of us, we were escorting nine B-24s and we got hit by\u2014I didn\u2019t count them, but I estimated probably eighteen to twenty Oscars. And the Oscar was a formidable airplane.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But they were coming up to meet us and I happened to be down below, and I was right in the middle of them coming up. And the first airplane I hit, I know I hit it, and he rolled over and went vertically into the clouds below. And I think that I probably killed him, but I claimed it as a probable.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But the second airplane I fired at, caught fire. And then I was trying to divert three of them from the B-24s and I pulled my airplane up into almost a stall and fired, hoping to divert them, and I got hit from below by one of the Oscars. And he was a very good shot or just lucky, but he hit me in the main hinge of the rudder, and I lost the entire rudder except a major portion of it was attached to the airplane by cable, which made flying\u2014the P-40 will fly without a rudder, but it\u2019s very difficult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And I had no choice but to sit there and this Japanese pilot\u2014because I didn\u2019t have anyone to come to my rescue, at least no one could see me\u2014and he hit me and hit me and hit me, and I kept calling to Charlie Tucker, my wingman, and saying, \u201cCharlie, if you don’t come help me, I’m gone. I can\u2019t make it.\u201d I said, \u201cSee, my airplane\u2019s going to catch fire.\u201d And fortunately, it didn\u2019t catch fire. And in a short while, I was enveloped in a hail of tracers, and I knew what had happened. One of my Chinese pilots had gotten into the fight behind the Japanese and then tried to shoot down the Japanese. I was really concerned he was going to bring us both down.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Oh, no.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: To make a long story short, he took care of the Japanese, I was able to get into some clouds, head back across the lines, and I got back to my little grass strip that I\u2019d taken off from. And I was able to land the airplane, and I would\u2019ve done it successfully except I didn\u2019t have any tires left. He had actually shot out both my tires. He had hit all three of my gas tanks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I had one armor-piercing bullet stuck in the armor plate right between my shoulder blades and I don’t know how many other places I was hit. And I don\u2019t know how many of those were .50 calibers from my Chinese friend who was trying to help me. But when I put the airplane on the ground, of course, the tires immediately came off and you don\u2019t roll very well on your rims. This was a grass strip, and the airplane stood on its nose and I climbed out the cockpit and slipped out of the nose to the ground. And a C-47 had landed just before me. And it had actually, it was an airplane that\u2014I had been ordered home two weeks before. And I went up to fly with the Chinese pilots because Chennault wanted to have someone with some experience fly with them on their first missions. And that\u2019s where I met the Chinese pilot who actually saved my life. I know that.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But as I climbed out of the airplane, a tall man had gotten out of the C-47, and I had stood the airplane on the nose right behind the C-47. And he walked over, and although I had never met him, I recognized him immediately. It was Eddie Rickenbacker who was on a tour of China. And I looked at him, and then nearly all I could say is, \u201cI\u2019m terribly embarrassed,\u201d but I was very happy to be there and be alive.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But that P-40 took a terrible beating, got me home safely and without the rudder, simply by accelerating or retarding the throttle because the vertical is on at an angle to compensate for the torque of the propeller. And you can move the nose a little bit one way or the other simply by accelerating the throttle or retarding the throttle. And I was able to get it on the ground without any trouble. But that’s the kind of a beating a P-40 would take.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: That\u2019s crazy. I can\u2019t imagine that. That\u2019s pretty ridiculous.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: In the night fight that I had\u2014the P-40\u2014I got hit before I even pulled the trigger the first time. And they knocked a three-inch hole right through the crankcase. And the airplane kept flying. I shot down probably three airplanes with a big hole right through my engine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: That\u2019s crazy. Actually, my next question has to do with the Japanese pilots. How would you compare the Japanese pilot quality to American pilot quality as far as their flying ability, so on, et cetera?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: I really don\u2019t know how to compare that because\u2014but my guess was that they were just as skillful as pilots as we were. Some of them maybe even more so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Okay. Yeah. From what I\u2019ve read, that\u2019s the impression of a lot of pilots in China. A lot of people who study the Pacific War more see that for the Marianas Turkey Shoot pilot quality went down and stuff. And so they assume the same thing happened in China. But in China, from what I\u2019ve read, pilot quality stayed pretty high all the way through the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Yeah, I think that\u2019s probably true, but I wasn\u2019t there for the last part of the war, so I really don\u2019t know.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Right. You talked about probably shooting down three bombers that night. Would you describe the process of how kills were confirmed from combats?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: How what?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: How kills were confirmed, how victories were confirmed after a combat?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Somewhat haphazardly. On this occasion, the airplane got shot down and exploded and you can\u2019t miss that. It was a big fire. As a matter of fact, one of our pilots on the ground\u2014and this occurred at fifteen thousand feet\u2014had a little box camera. And he clicked it, and in the positive that came out, you can see just a dot of light, but when that\u2019s blown up, you can see a full airplane on fire.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Oh, wow.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: I didn\u2019t even know I had that photo, but I’ve got that right on my desk here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: That\u2019s outstanding.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: The plane you can see the silhouette of, the bomber, its two engines. But we didn\u2019t have gun camera film, we didn\u2019t have gun cameras. And so you had to take people\u2019s word for some of the victories. And maybe in some instances there were over-claims, maybe in some under-claims. I just don\u2019t know. We would all much preferred having good gun cameras, but in China there was no way to get them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Right. Okay. Well, that\u2019s very interesting. I know from what I\u2019ve read, it was very difficult to estimate the results against the Japanese, with the supply situation, no gun cameras, made it hard to record that stuff, and especially over enemy territory where the Chinese can\u2019t stumble across a shot down bomber or something and tell you, \u201cHey, it was shot down.\u201d So\u2014<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Would you say that it was easier to confirm kills when they were made over friendly territory?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Oh, yes. Actually, there were airplanes they\u2019d found that nobody claimed. Without gun cameras, it was difficult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Right. A couple more questions for you, sir. From your point of view, how would you describe the Japanese leadership or possibly the way that they carried out missions? I\u2019ve read that a lot of it was very rigid air discipline, very set in their tactics, not really as open to the flow battle that the Americans were. Where you dive in and attack and if you have to leave, you have to leave or it\u2019s very much more rigid than that is what I had read. And I was wondering if you could comment on that?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: It was. The Japanese had the code of the Samurai. They often had their sword with them in the cockpit. And they had this code printed that some of them tied in their pockets and they were not supposed to leave a fight. And if they were wounded or damaged in a battle, they would pick a likely target and dive into it. And we saw that happen several times.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I was up, and it must\u2019ve been this, I had five airplanes and we were attacked by I think forty-five Japanese. And boy, you just make a few passes at high speed through their formation, and that\u2019s about all you could do. But while we were fighting up at altitude, there were Japanese down strafing our airport. And one\u2014we presumed that he was a squadron commander because he had his sword with him\u2014and he had a wound in his buttocks and our kids on the ground with their rifles and pistols were all shooting at the Zeroes that were strafing our airport.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And apparently, someone hit this guy and he staggered at low altitude and made a turn and came back. And the only building that was impressive at all was the guardhouse, which was built of stone. And he, apparently, was hit. The witnesses said that his airplane kind of wobbled around, he did a 180-degree turn, he came back and at low level, he flew directly into the guardhouse.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Well, when I came down from the fight that we\u2019d had at high altitude and landed, the guardhouse was still burning. And I looked in and there was the Japanese pilot, but he was in on the stones and there was fire all around him. And I asked them, I said, \u201cOh, who is that?\u201d And they said, \u201cAs far as we know, he is the pilot of the airplane that flew into the building.\u201d And I said, \u201cWell, has anybody made an attempt to pull him out?\u201d And he said, \u201cYeah, the Chinese pulled him out, they got his papers and then they threw him back in the fire.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Oh, no.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: And I said, \u201cWell, get him out and let\u2019s see that he gets a proper burial.\u201d And so they did, and they found that\u2014the doctors found that he had a bullet wound in his buttocks, he\u2019d been hit, but he was perfectly capable of flying the airplane, and probably could have flown it home, but apparently he would\u2019ve been disgraced. So, he chose to dive into the only building off our airport that looked rather solid.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: That\u2019s ridiculous.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: And I had another one where we could never get a prisoner. And the Chinese called in and said that they had a prisoner. This was right after a fight over our own airport, and this was in the neighborhood. So, I sent out our intelligence officer to pick him up and bring him in, and the intelligence officer had a jeep. He got out there and they had this Japanese pilot in a house, and the house was surrounded of course by people who were in the neighborhood who were quite interested in where we had a Japanese prisoner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And my intelligence officer got there just in time to give him his last cigarette. What had happened was he had a knife concealed in his boot and he had apparently allowed himself to be taken to this house. And when he got there, I guess he had second thoughts. He pulled out this knife that no one knew he had, and he stabbed one of the Chinese guards and of course, they killed him. And that\u2019s about as close as we ever got to getting a prisoner.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Geez. So, would you say that this different culture that the Japanese had, because pilots didn\u2019t come back who probably could have come back from combats like you yourself did when you were badly shot up, would you say that this was a limitation to their war effort\u2014that this hurt their war effort?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: I would think so. We tried to save the lives of our pilots. Their code said, \u201cYou don\u2019t bring your airplane back damaged, dive into something.\u201d And the morning after the night I was shot down I was in a missionary hospital, and I was watching the fight from the roof of the hospital. The doctor wouldn\u2019t let me go. I wasn\u2019t hurt badly. I could have gone right back to duty. But the doctor insisted that I stay at the hospital overnight.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And I saw there was a formation of Japanese fighters and a formation of P-40s led by Tex that made a head-on run. And as you could see them approaching each other, you could see that the little smoke trail of the machine guns, the little puffs of smoke, as they approached each other. And you saw Tex hit the Japanese leader and instead of trying to get away, the Japanese leader just started to circle. I guess he was probably at fifteen thousand feet and he began to circle, and he made three circles over the town of Hengyang and our airport was right on the edge of town and the hospital was in the town, and all of a sudden he made what looked to me like about three 360-degree turns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
His airplane was obviously damaged, because he had a thin trail of smoke. And when he got over our airfield, he turned the airplane vertically and flew it from about twelve thousand feet all the way down and dove into a dummy aircraft. We had decoys, dummies, on the airfield. And I just marveled at how he held that airplane vertically all the way from about twelve thousand feet until he hit the ground. He missed the dummy\u2014a bamboo airplane dummy\u2014he missed it by about, oh, twenty or thirty feet.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And he was following their code: \u201cDon\u2019t come home. Dive into something and kill yourself and do as much damage to the enemy as you could.\u201d They, in certain respects, made a very formidable opponent, but in many respects, it was a waste of life. He could easily have jumped out and been taken prisoner and survived the war. They didn\u2019t do that. We did.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: It sounds like a lot of them probably could have even made it back to base with their damaged aircraft and flown another day too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: That\u2019s right. That is absolutely right. Chennault\u2019s philosophy was entirely different: \u201cIt\u2019s better to shoot and run away and live to shoot another day.\u201d Chennault didn\u2019t have pilots to spare. When the AVG was disbanded, the United States Air Corps had no replacement for the AVG. There was no one to replace us. Chennault was able to get some AVG to stay for a limited time while he tried to build the Fourteenth Air Force by pickups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
I happened to be assigned to the Middle East program. I was moving airplanes from Iraq and Iran into the Soviet Union when I got a wire saying report to China. That\u2019s largely how the Fourteenth Air Force was built.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: One last question, sir. Is there any event in which by taking initiative or leadership on the lowest level in the squadron, you or someone else made a difference in the war? Was able to shoot down more Japanese or attack their base in a certain way that was successful because of low-level leadership or initiative?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: That may have been. Chennault allowed us to take initiative. And so I think that was important simply because we were such a small outfit, it would be hard not to take the initiative one way or the other.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Right. Okay. Well, thank you very much for talking to me today, sir. I appreciate it greatly.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: I hope I haven\u2019t misled you on anything.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Oh no, sir. What you\u2019ve said is very helpful to my paper and I appreciate it a lot and in fact, I\u2019ll email you my paper when it\u2019s done and ready to turn in.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: I would be very happy to read it. I\u2019ll probably learn something.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: I\u2019ve tried to research all the angles and everything. When Mr. Zemke had mentioned that I could possibly interview you, I was very excited to be able to include that in my research.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Well, for whatever it\u2019s worth, it’s been a pleasure talking to you and I hope you\u2019ve learned\u2014certainly you\u2019ve learned that we were short on supplies and Chennault was really an outstanding leader. He was easy to work for. I did a lot of dumb things and he tolerated it. I guess he understood people, but I was also inspired by his leadership and it helped me a great deal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Well, and I very much look up to his leadership too. I\u2019ve read his book and I just find him a very fascinating person, especially with how he went against the norm and had just fascinating, brilliant, very forward-thinking, tactical and strategic ideas that won the war.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Yes, he did, and he was\u2014unfortunately, and this is true\u2014at higher levels, we had leaders who disagreed with one another. We had the big conflict between Stilwell and Chennault, and we had a big conflict between Bissell and Chennault, and that made it difficult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
We had a leadership mess in the CBI. The two top leaders in China were Chiang Kai-shek and Stilwell. And Stilwell had no respect for Chiang Kai-shek. As a matter of fact, he had a hatred of Chiang Kai-shek. In fact, Chiang didn\u2019t have much respect for Stilwell. Then under Stilwell, the second American was Clayton Bissell, who was promoted one day ahead of Chennault. Bissell was really not a competent leader. Chennault was a far better leader than Bissell, but they were in conflict and that made it very difficult, well for everybody.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Then on the real topside, they had Admiral Mountbatten who was the commander of the whole area, and he and Stilwell didn\u2019t get along. Stilwell referred to him as \u201cthat limey.\u201d And I know Mountbatten, who was very much a gentleman, didn\u2019t respect General Stilwell. So that made it very difficult because it creeps down below.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: I would imagine so. That would be a very, very interesting situation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Yeah, it was. But it is a shame when your top people are in conflict.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: I would imagine so. And actually, I\u2019ve read a lot about Stilwell and Chennault and Bissell. And I\u2019ve got a World War II history class that I\u2019ll take when I\u2019m a senior, and I\u2019m very interested in writing about that as a paper, how that affected the war in China\u2014well in the entire CBI, I guess. How that affected the war\u2014that relationship, that conflict. I think that\u2019d be a very interesting thing to write about.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Yeah, it did, but it didn’t dominate the problem out there, the thing that really dominated it was supply. What you could get to the theater in China, and the only thing you could get was what you could carry across the Hump in an airplane, and that made it very difficult.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: I would imagine. So, these days I think it\u2019s easy to forget how difficult things were back then, especially since we\u2019ve got such gigantic transport aircraft now that can carry tanks even. I mean, that kind of thing I\u2019m sure was unimaginable back then.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Well, we wish we\u2019d had more. I know when we went into Burma on the 1st Air Commando, the person who had the vision was General Arnold, the Chief of the Air Force. He\u2019s the one that organized the 1st Air Commandos, named them the 1st Air Commandos, and Wingate had infiltrated through the enemy lines. They were about to cancel the campaign this time because he couldn\u2019t get his wounded out, and that\u2019s how we became involved. Churchill asked President Roosevelt if the US Air Corps, well, the Army Air Corps could provide ambulance airplanes to airlift his wounded out of the jungle, or out of the countryside in Burma.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
And apparently, we agreed to do it and that\u2019s how Phil Cochran and I became involved. When General Arnold said that we had to airlift his wounded out, I didn’t want to do it. He said, \u201cOne of you boys has got to do it,\u201d talking to Cochran and I. And I said, \u201cGeneral, I don’t want to do it.\u201d I said, \u201cI\u2019m a fighter pilot. I\u2019ve spent my entire career training. I\u2019ve been through a campaign in China, now I’ve got an opportunity to go to England and fight over Germany.\u201d And I said, \u201cThere isn\u2019t a better job in the entire air force, and now you want me to fly a light plane, a puddle jumper.\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
That\u2019s when he said, \u201cI wasn’t going to tell you boys, but let me tell you what I want you to do.\u201d He said, \u201cThis man walks in and when he gets to where\u2014he fights well, but when he gets there, his troops are tired, some of them are sick. It\u2019s very difficult.\u201d He says, \u201cWe can airlift them in, and I want it done and I want them supported and I\u2019m going to give you everything you need to do it. You have only one priority.\u201d And he says, \u201cNow which one of you is going to do it?\u201d<\/p>\n\n\n\n
But it ended up, we started out as co-commanders, but that\u2019s difficult. So, Phil outranked me, and Phil was the commander, I was his deputy. And we put together a composite unit to airlift Wingate and his people behind the enemy lines. We had engineers and gliders that would move little construction equipment that we needed to scrape out the airstrips, and we built seven airfields deep in enemy territory that would accommodate C-47s, because that\u2019s all we could get. And we moved in a lot of people and we supported them and we had a significant role in defending India from the last Japanese invasion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Yeah, I actually wrote a paper about the 1st Air Commandos last semester because what I would like to do in my career is become a special operations pilot flying maybe MC-130s or AC-130s. And so I\u2019m really interested in the Air Commandos because that\u2019s the heritage of the special operations program.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: That\u2019s right. We didn\u2019t call it special ops in those days. I\u2019d never heard the words \u201cspecial ops.\u201d All we knew was that General Arnold wanted them airlifted and that we were to look at the resources that the United States Air Force had and airlift Wingate\u2019s people and land them behind the enemy lines, which was quite an assignment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: It was indeed. And I read that you, sir, in fact flew one of the first gliders in and did a spot-on landing despite all the chaos.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Yep. Well, anyway, we did it. We didn\u2019t know how we were going to do it, but we did it finally and we looked at it as awe-inspiring. It was a great adventure for young people. And all of our kids were tremendously motivated. They were all patriotic and it was really a great privilege for Phil Cochran and myself, even though we were just fighter pilots.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Well, I very much appreciate you being willing to talk to me and giving me such great information. It\u2019s been a real pleasure for me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Okay, well, I hope this has helped you in your studies. It was a very interesting period in the history of the Army Air Corps. It\u2019s just one of any number of steps that we\u2019ve made to bring us to where we are today.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Yes, sir, and I’ll tell you what there\u2019s a possibility this summer that I might be out there in Washington and I\u2019d just love to be able to take you out to lunch or something to say thank you, if the opportunity arises.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Give me a call, and I\u2019d be happy to join you for lunch or you could have lunch with me.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Well, thank you very much, sir, and I look forward to hopefully meeting you and I will send you this paper when it\u2019s done and I hope you enjoy it and I hope it does justice to you and the brave people that you fought with, out there in China back in World War II.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Yeah. Well, the brave people are just American kids that did the best they could, and fortunately, we won. We\u2019re looking at a difficult situation today though. Very difficult. I don\u2019t know the answer to that of what we face today. Because it\u2019s so political. It\u2019s one thing that maybe you guys today got to make them throw some light on, I hope so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: I hope so too, sir.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Well, it\u2019s been nice talking with you and good luck on your paper.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Thank you very much, sir. You have a nice day.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
John R. Alison: Thank you very much. Bye<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Daniel Jackson: Bye.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Interview by Daniel Jackson, April 26, 2007. John R. Alison: Oh, hi, how are you? Daniel Jackson: I\u2019m fine, sir. How are you doing today? John R. Alison: Hold on just one second. Daniel Jackson: No problem. John R. Alison: I\u2019m sorry. Daniel Jackson: Oh, that\u2019s fine, sir. John R. Alison: Is it Cadet Jackson?…<\/p>\n