Interview by Daniel Jackson, July 29, 2008
Daniel Jackson: Hello, sir. My name’s Dan Jackson from the Air Force Academy. I’m a history major here, and I’m working on a paper about guerrilla aerial warfare in China during World War II.
John C. Conn: All right.
Daniel Jackson: I know that you were stationed behind enemy lines with the 74th Fighter Squadron in ‘44 to ‘45 there, and I thought you might be able to provide me some information on what operations were like during that time.
John C. Conn: Okay. Well, I don’t know what I can do to help you, but what do you want to know?
Daniel Jackson: Well, first of all, I saw that you were on the big mission to Shanghai, and you were credited with seven aircraft destroyed on the ground. And I was wondering what was your opinion on why that mission was a big success? How you were able to surprise the Japanese?
John C. Conn: Well, I don’t know. I guess because we caught them by surprise. We had a lot of targets near Shanghai, but we never hit Shanghai. I don’t know if they thought we couldn’t reach them or what, but we could reach them easily. We had pretty good success and surprised them.
Daniel Jackson: Were there any Japanese fighters in the air when you got there, or were they all on the ground?
John C. Conn: No, they were all on the ground. I don’t remember. I don’t think we had any opposition. But we shot them up on the ground.
Daughter: Weren’t there some prisoners that were down there at the time, that were yelling?
John C. Conn: Yes, there was, yeah.
Daniel Jackson: Do you remember how many airfields near Shanghai that you hit? Were they in the town, or were they on the outskirts of town?
John C. Conn: Yeah, there was, I think three. There was one south, one straight south-west and one west that we hit.
Daughter: Okay. You there?
Daniel Jackson: Uh-huh.
Daughter: Yes. You’re breaking up a little bit.
Daniel Jackson: Yeah, I don’t have the best connection here. I’m sorry.
Daughter: That’s okay.
John C. Conn: Okay.
Daniel Jackson: My next question was how was the supply situation when you were stationed behind enemy lines? Was there a fuel shortage, or did you have a shortage of spare parts or anything like that?
John C. Conn: Yeah, everything. Everything had to be flown in to us. So, we’d fly a mission, and then we’d wait a week or so until we got enough fuel, ammo, and parts to fly another one. The supply situation was just pretty serious over the Hump.
Daniel Jackson: Why didn’t the Japanese just attack the airfield that you were stationed at?
John C. Conn: Well, I don’t know. They did eventually. We got to hurting them enough, and then they decided to come and chase us out. We had ground defenses, and we had a few Chinese with us.
Daniel Jackson: Were you still there during the evacuation?
John C. Conn: Pardon?
Daniel Jackson: When they put the ground offensive to take the airfield, were you still there? Were you present when they evacuated the field?
John C. Conn: Yeah.
Daniel Jackson: Did you fly out? How exactly did they evacuate everybody? Did they have transports fly in and evacuate everybody?
John C. Conn: Yeah, we flew out. Yeah.
Daniel Jackson: Right.
John C. Conn: We just flew out to some of our rear bases.
Daniel Jackson: Okay. Besides the airfield in Shanghai, what kind of targets were you hitting when you were based at Kanchow?
John C. Conn: Oh, places along the southeast coast of China: ports and things, shipping.
Daniel Jackson: Would you be bombing these or strafing these or both? Dive-bombing, skip bombing?
John C. Conn: These were mostly strafing runs.
Daniel Jackson: At that time, did you guys still have P-40s there, or were they all P-51s?
John C. Conn: Well, we had P-51s by then, yeah.
Daniel Jackson: And were those B and C models then?
John C. Conn: Pardon me?
Daniel Jackson: Were those B and C model P-51s?
John C. Conn: I think so. As near as I can remember, yeah.
Daniel Jackson: How did those—
John C. Conn: That was a long time ago.
Daniel Jackson: Right, right. I had read elsewhere that a lot of people thought that the P-40 was a much better plane for strafing runs because it had two more .50-caliber guns and that it was less vulnerable to ground fire. I was wondering if—
John C. Conn: The P-51 was not too good for ground strafing because of the coolant radiators. You take a hit in your coolant radiator, you were finished. You had about ten minutes.
Daniel Jackson: How often would you have somebody in the squadron shot down because of that?
John C. Conn: Oh, I don’t remember really. Not too often, but usually, if you got hit and you got down safely, well, usually you were okay because Chinese would get you out. But if you got down safely then you were usually okay.
Daniel Jackson: Okay. Did you get much in the way of replacement aircraft out there?
John C. Conn: Oh gee, I don’t remember. I guess we got some, I don’t remember.
Daniel Jackson: Okay. Did you ever fly joint missions with other squadrons?
John C. Conn: Well yeah, we had… Oh, it’s been a long time ago, I’m trying to remember. We had the 74th, 75th and the 76th Fighter Squadrons, 23rd fighter group, and then there was another outfit. I don’t remember them.
Daniel Jackson: Are you talking about the 118th Tactical Reconnaissance Squadron?
John C. Conn: 118th, yeah. It was a photo outfit.
Daniel Jackson: Okay. Let’s see here. What kind of a setup would you have? In Shanghai, going back to Shanghai, were all the Japanese aircraft just lined up next to the runway? Were they in revetments? Did it look like they’re in revetments?
John C. Conn: No, they just had them lined up around the edge of the ramp, wingtip to wingtip.
Daniel Jackson: Did they explode fairly easily? Were they full of fuel, or were they empty?
John C. Conn: Yeah, fueled. If you hit them, they start burning right away. That was one of the big problems. And once they were burning, you couldn’t see the ones that weren’t burning, there was so much smoke.
Daniel Jackson: Yeah, I guess there’s pluses and minuses to that.
John C. Conn: Yeah.
Daniel Jackson: Generally speaking on missions, how accurate was Japanese ground fire?
John C. Conn: Well, we didn’t have too much to worry about on the ground fire. It didn’t bother us too much.
Daniel Jackson: Was it mostly just small arms fire?
John C. Conn: Well, they had anti-aircraft fire too. In fact, I remember one time I turned in on the target and right in the middle of my gun sight, I had right in quick succession about three pumps of anti-aircraft fire. So, needless to say, I had to break that attack off because they had me lined up pretty good.
Daniel Jackson: Yeah. Normally when you’d make attacks on Japanese shipping, or on the trip to Shanghai or any of these places, would you usually fly at high altitude to the target, or would you fly low to avoid Japanese spotters? How would you approach the target?
John C. Conn: Well, I think we went in at about ten thousand feet or so. And then we got within about fifty miles of the target, then we’d make a steady letdown, picking up speed so we could hit the target area at pretty good speed.
Daniel Jackson: When the Japanese ground offensive started coming towards Suichuan and Kanchow, was your squadron used against the Japanese infantry to try and stem the offensive?
John C. Conn: I don’t remember. I don’t think we did too much, no. But—
Daniel Jackson: Do you think it—
John C. Conn: … I don’t remember. I don’t think we did. We were not very effective against ground troops.
Daniel Jackson: How was squadron morale, flying behind enemy lines like that?
John C. Conn: It’s pretty good. We didn’t have any problems.
Daniel Jackson: And everybody felt like they were really making a difference in the campaign and everything?
John C. Conn: Well yeah, I think so.
Daniel Jackson: Do you think it impacted the Chinese morale at all?
John C. Conn: Yeah, I think so.
Daniel Jackson: As a pilot there, did you have much interaction with the Chinese people at all?
John C. Conn: Not too much, no.
Daniel Jackson: Now I know that during the Ichi-Go Offensive, during the first part of it in the spring of 1944, they had thought that the Japanese were going to take the two airfields that the 74th and the 118th were flying from later when you were there, and that they destroyed several of the facilities. A lot of the buildings and whatnot, they burned to the ground. So by the time that you got out there and were flying from behind enemy lines, what were the facilities like?
John C. Conn: Oh gee, I don’t remember.
Daniel Jackson: What were you guys living in? Barracks, or were you living in tents?
John C. Conn: I think tents mostly.
Daniel Jackson: Okay. And what about maintenance? Was that mostly done out in the open then?
John C. Conn: Yeah. Oh, yeah.
Daniel Jackson: Do you remember about how often you would fly missions?
John C. Conn: Well, not too often, because the problem was supplies—fuel and ammunition and things—it had to all be flown in over the Hump. So we’d fly a mission, and then we’d wait about a week or so until we got enough to fly another one.
Daniel Jackson: Okay. When you were out there, how well did you know Pappy Herbst?
John C. Conn: Well, he was our squadron commander. I knew him for some time.
Daniel Jackson: What kind of person was he? What kind of leadership style did he have?
John C. Conn: Oh gee, I don’t know. He was a good man. He was kind of—oh, I don’t know what you would say, aloof—he didn’t mix with the troops too much, and he kept to himself. He was a good man, a good leader.
Daniel Jackson: Now, do you know who did most of the planning for your missions?
John C. Conn: Who did it?
Daniel Jackson: Yeah.
John C. Conn: Well, I guess, I’m trying to think. Major Chapman, I guess, he was our operations officer.
Daniel Jackson: Okay. Was there any particular mission, or any particular day that really stuck out in your memory that is just one of the most significant days that you had in China? Was there anything that you’d like to mention?
John C. Conn: Oh gee, I don’t remember. Our missions to Shanghai were the most memorable. We shot up the Japanese pretty good.
Daniel Jackson: Were you on both missions to Shanghai, or just the first one?
John C. Conn: I think just the one—the first one.
Daniel Jackson: Okay, well let’s see here. Well, I had one other question, and that has to do with: Did you have night attacks, like the night menace attacks from the Japanese—night bombings or anything like that?
John C. Conn: Oh, yeah. They would send a bomber over to harass us mostly. They didn’t do much damage or anything, they just—We could hear them overhead, but we didn’t worry too much about them.
Daniel Jackson: Would that happen almost every night?
John C. Conn: Oh yeah, quite often.
Daniel Jackson: Did your squadron ever attempt any night interceptions?
John C. Conn: No, not that I remember.
Daniel Jackson: Okay. And you said that the bombers really didn’t do much damage?
John C. Conn: No, not usually. They weren’t too accurate.
Daniel Jackson: Did you guys have to run out to the slit trenches every time that they came up?
John C. Conn: Well, we’d go to the slit trenches.
Daniel Jackson: So, the goal then was to make you lose sleep basically?
John C. Conn: I don’t know, I guess.
Daniel Jackson: Interesting. Well, sir, that’s gone through all my questions. I really appreciate your help. If you have anything to add, or if anything else comes to mind, please email me or call me and I will plan on having this paper done about guerrilla air warfare in China by November timeframe. That’s when it’s due. So, I’ll be sure to send you a copy when it’s done.